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ABSTRACT 
 
Toward an Understanding of the Possibility of a Religious Leap in Kierkegaard’s A 
Literary Review. 
 (August 2008) 
Erik Sven Berquist, B.A., Minnesota State University, Mankato 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Daniel Conway 
 
 In his work A Literary Review, Kierkegaard bemoans much about “the present 
age,” and in the text he presents an extremely bleak picture of the potential for one to 
live an authentically religious life.  However, he also makes it clear that he believes the 
present age is in a uniquely superior position because a religious leap remains possible.    
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why Kierkegaard believes that a religious leap 
is possible in the present age.  I attempt to understand one promising method of 
achieving a religious leap by appealing to another work by Kierkegaard entitled 
Philosophical Fragments.  It is my position that, given a particular interpretation, 
Philosophical Fragments places some readers in a position where a religious leap 
emerges as a possibility. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: VEXING CONCERNS IN THE REVIEW 
In his work A Literary Review1 Kierkegaard bemoans much about “the present 
age,” and in the text he presents an extremely bleak picture of the potential for one to 
live an authentically religious life.  However, he also makes it clear that he believes the 
present age is in a uniquely superior position because a religious leap remains possible.    
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why Kierkegaard believes that a religious leap 
is possible in the present age.  I will attempt to understand one promising method of 
achieving a religious leap by appealing to another work by Kierkegaard entitled 
Philosophical Fragments.2  It is my position that, given a particular interpretation, 
Philosophical Fragments places some readers in a position where a religious leap 
emerges as a possibility.  Chapter II and III are devoted to clarifying and advancing a 
particular reading of Philosophical Fragments.  Once I have established a reading of 
Philosophical Fragments I will consider how this reading might help account for some 
of the confusing comments made in A Literary Review.    
The purpose of Chapter II is to begin a discussion about the purpose of 
Philosophical Fragments.  In it, I consider one attempt to make sense of Philosophical 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format of the Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1
 Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A 
Literary Review, trans. ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong, (Princeton:Princeton 
UP, 1978.) 
 
2
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, trans. ed. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987). 
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Fragments by Stephen Evans.  Despite many comments that suggest that Kierkegaard 
resists apologetic arguments, Evans argues that some “non-foundationalist” apologetic 
arguments can be found in Philosophical Fragments.  I present a number of reasons for 
thinking that Evans’s account only reveals part of the story of Philosophical Fragments.  
More specifically, I show that his approach is mistaken because he does not take 
seriously remarks that Climacus writes elsewhere regarding his general strategy as an 
author and the ironic character of the text.   Though I believe his approach is ultimately 
incomplete, Evans offers an important stepping-stone to the complete reading that I will 
present in Chapter III.  
The previous chapter considers the validity of Steven Evans’s reading of 
Philosophical Fragments as a work of apologetics.  Chapter IV considers a view that 
attempts to accommodate these observations and show that such a reading is consistent 
with a sort of apologetic reading of Philosophical Fragments.  However, the apologetic 
arguments are ultimately self-undermining, and they are only part of the broader project 
of Philosophical Fragments.  Once I demonstrate that one can understand the text in this 
manner, it will become clear that the text can provide important insights into the way in 
which Kierkegaard desires to frame religious questions.  In the third chapter, I will 
demonstrate how this insight provides a potential tool for understanding claims made 
regarding the possibility of a religious leap in A Literary Review. 
In Chapter IV, I turn my attention to considering Kierkegaard’s work A Literary 
Review.  I reflect on some potential problems in this work as outlined in an essay by 
Daniel W. Conway entitled “Modest Expectations: Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the 
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Present Age.”3  Conway claims that Kierkegaard advances disparate claims about the 
role of reflexion and the possibility of religious authenticity.  I consider whether 
Mulhall’s reading of Philosophical Fragments offers any promising insight into how one 
might be able to make sense of the troubling claims Conway locates in A Literary 
Review.  I will demonstrate that Philosophical Fragments presents a possible solution to 
the problems in A Literary Review.  Though it initially appears that Kierkegaard's 
conception of reflexion makes an authentic religious life impossible, there are reasons 
for being somewhat optimistic regarding ability of some to achieve a genuine religious 
existence in the present age.  If I am successful, and I believe that I am, then I will have 
revealed an important connection between A Literary Review and Philosophical 
Fragments, namely, that Philosophical Fragments is a means by which someone can 
break free from the problems of the present age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Conway, Daniel W.  “Modest Expectations: Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the 
Present Age” in Kierkegaard Studies: Yearbook 1999, eds. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and 
Hermann Deuser, (de Gruyter: New York, 1999.) 
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CHAPTER II 
 
WAS KIERKEGAARD’S JOHANNES CLIMACUS A CHRISTIAN APOLOGIST? 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline preliminary concerns regarding Johannes 
Climacus’ purpose in Philosophical Fragments.4  In particular, I will examine one 
attempt to make sense of Philosophical Fragments by Stephen Evans.  Though I believe 
his approach is ultimately incomplete, Evans offers insights that allow us to understand 
significant stylistic elements in Philosophical Fragments, namely, that one can read it as 
a work of nonfoundationalist apologetics.  The second chapter will solve the problems 
that are associated with Evans’s reading, and we will gain a clear picture of 
Philosophical Fragments as work in which Kierkegaard endeavors to put the reader in a 
position to live an authentically religious life.  In the final chapter, I will demonstrate  
how this work presents itself as a potential means of solving problems in A Literary 
Review.    
Stephen Evans has argued that one can read Philosophical Fragments as a work 
that contains arguments that “seem aimed at showing that something like Christianity is 
true.”5  According to Evans, it is easy to recognize that Philosophical Fragments is a 
work that appears aimed at attacking apologetic arguments, so he takes himself to be  
advancing a controversial thesis.  Evans argues that interpreting the text as anti-
                                                 
4
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, trans. ed. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong, (Princeton:Princeton UP, 1987.) 
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 Evans, C. Stephen, “Apologetic Arguments in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical 
Fragments,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and 
Johannes Climacus, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1994.) 
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apologetic is too limited: it only considers one kind of apologetics, namely, the 
“foundationalist” sort. Evans admits that Climacus rejects foundationalist apologetics 
however, contends that Climacus can be read as endorsing another kind of apologetics, 
which the obvious view overlooks: “non-foundationalist” apologetics.  Thus, Evans 
concludes, the apparent conflict between Climacus’ rejection of apologetic arguments 
and his overall philosophical project is the result of failing to distinguish between two 
divergent notions of apologetics. When Climacus’ apologetics are properly understood, 
however, no conflict arises. Contrary, then, to the traditional view, Climacus makes 
room for apologetic arguments to play an important role in believers’ lives. 
I will argue that Evans is correct in pointing out that there are apologetic 
arguments in Philosophical Fragments, but he fails to offer an adequate account of the 
rhetorical function of these arguments. This chapter will result in a question that I devote 
the next chapter to addressing, namely, if we cannot understand the purpose of these 
apologetic arguments in Philosophical Fragments in the way that Evans does, then how 
are we to understand the function of these arguments?   
This chapter proceeds by summarizing Evans’s argument. I then offer my 
objections to Evans’s position. I do so in two steps, first, by appealing to Climacus’ self-
described project as an author, and, then, by appealing to the remarks Climacus makes 
about a review of Philosophical Fragments.  
An Outline of Evans’s Essay 
 By pointing to various sections of the text that appear to advance apologetic 
arguments and reviewing the text as a whole, Evans concludes that Philosophical 
 6 
Fragments is a book that can be read as if it were intended to make Christian views more 
plausible.6  Though it seems that Climacus is often trying to make Christianity appear 
less reasonable, Evans argues, we can understand him as presenting a sustained case for 
the truth of Christianity.    
At the close of the first chapter entitled “Though-Project” Climacus engages in 
dialogue with an unidentified interlocutor.  This chapter is devoted to demonstrating an 
alternative to the Socratic method of achieving truth, and the alternative Climacus offers 
implies something that is suspiciously similar to the Christian claim of humanity’s sin 
condition.  Climacus refers to our inability to achieve knowledge of the truth on our own 
as “sin.”7  The way out of our sinful state is not through Socratic recollection; rather, we 
can only have knowledge of the truth by divine intervention.  The notion that humanity 
is in a state of ignorance, which Climacus likens to sin, coupled with the position that we 
can only escape this ignorance with the aid of the divine, is too similar to the Christian 
story for Climacus’ audience to ignore.  This suspicious similarity results in a 
confrontation between Climacus and an interlocutor.  The resemblance to the Christian 
story spurs the interlocutor to accuse Climacus of plagiarism.  Commenting on this 
similarity, the interlocutor says of Climacus, “you are behaving like a vagabond who 
charges a fee for showing an area that everyone can see.”8  The implication of this 
passage being, everyone is already aware of and has access to the story that Climacus is 
                                                 
6
 Evans, 72. 
 
7
 Kierkegaard, 15. 
 
8
 Ibid, 21. 
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telling.  Since it is obvious that Climacus could not be the author, Climacus must be 
committing an act of blatant plagiarism.  Climacus acknowledges that he is not truly the 
author, and he goes further and claims that no human could, in good conscience, admit 
to being the author of this story.  The fact that no author can honestly claim this as his or 
her own story, Climacus asserts, is what makes this story so fascinating, and this  is what 
motivates Evans’s apologetic analysis.  
Evans calls this argument the “‘No Human Author’ Argument,”9 and, he asserts, 
it corresponds to a much older, and commonly used apologetic argument.  Evans 
outlines the argument in the following manner: 
1. A religious claim of type X could not have been invented by 
any human being, but only by God. 
2. Christianity makes a claim of type X. 
3. This religious claim of Christianity could only have been 
invented by God.10 
The X in Climacus’ rendition of the argument, according to Evans, is the claim that 
humanity is inescapably caught in error and will remain caught in this error until she is 
pedagogically related to god.  It is only through divine intervention that one can avoid 
being in error.  This notion is not, according to Climacus, something that any human 
could take responsibility for, and so it must be from another source, namely, God.  Since 
                                                 
9
 Evans, 65. 
 
10
 Ibid, 66. 
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Christianity makes this claim, Christianity makes claims that could only originate from a 
divine source.  Thus, Christianity appears to have a genuine sanction from the divine.   
The second argument, like the first, occurs at the close of a chapter, this time 
entitled “The God as Teacher and Savior.” Once again, this argument comes up during a 
discussion with the interlocutor.  In the second chapter, Climacus outlines a narrative of 
an incarnation and the incarnate god’s redemptive task as the only means of escaping the 
error that is outlined in the first chapter.  The story sounds more than suspiciously 
similar to the biblical story of Christ as God incarnate, and the interlocutor’s charge is 
once again plagiarism.  The interlocutor strikes a dramatic chord, claiming, “What you 
are composing is the shabbiest plagiarism ever to appear, since it is nothing more or less 
than what any child knows…”11  Climacus responds by first admitting that he is, indeed, 
not the poet responsible for the poem, but then he wonders who the poet might be: 
But who then is the poet?...If there is no poet when there nevertheless is a 
poem—this would be curious, indeed, as curious as hearing flute playing 
although there is no flute player…perhaps it is not a poem at all, or in any 
case is not ascribable to any human being or to the human race, either.12 
 
It would appear that Climacus and his interlocutor must consider the possibility that not 
only is this story not Climacus’, but they also cannot attribute it to any single individual, 
and therefore it must come from a non-human source; i.e. the divine.     
 Evans calls this argument “The Argument from the Uniqueness of the 
Incarnation.”  In the respect that this argument depends on a particular Christian story 
that cannot be attributed to a human source, it functions in essentially the same manner 
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 Kierkegaard, 35. 
 
12
 Ibid.  
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as the previous argument.  Since appealing to a human author will not account for the 
substance of the story, it must have a divine origin.  Moreover, since this claim is a 
Christian claim, it suggests that particularly Christianity has some divine authority. 
 Evans locates the third apologetic argument in the appendix to the third chapter.     
In the appendix, Climacus argues that there are two passionate responses that one might 
have to encountering the incarnation.  Either there will be the “happy encounter,” which 
occurs when the disciple approaches God in the passion of faith, or there will be an 
“unhappy encounter,” which occurs when the prospective student misunderstands the 
incarnation.13  Climacus refers to the unhappy encounter as the offense.  The unhappy 
encounter results from the offensive nature of the paradoxical absurdity that is the 
incarnation.  The claim that it is possible for something to be both fully god and fully 
man is offensive to reason.  To assert that both the infinitely potent qualities ascribed to 
a god and the finite capacity of man in a single living god-man is paradoxical.  Given 
this, Climacus reasons, surely any rational thinker would avoid assenting to such a 
proposition.  More importantly, the rational mind would likely find the assertion of an 
incarnate god intellectually offensive.  Climacus indicates, however, that the paradoxical 
character of the incarnation is evidence for the divine origin of the story.  Evans argues 
that, if we believe that someone truly receives a legitimate revelation from God, then it 
would only make sense that this revelation would be something that would rise above 
our ability to articulate intelligibly, and we could not expect to comprehend it.  
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that these claims, which propose to provide an 
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 Ibid, 49. 
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account of the work of a divine source, are incomprehensible.  The argument comes 
down to the assertion that the sheer implausibility of the Christian story is evidence for 
its divine inspiration.  Evans strengthens his apologetic interpretation of these claims by 
appealing to a similar argument in Aquinas, which I will not rehearse here. 
 Evans believes that the text as a whole represents the final apologetic argument.  
In order to outline this argument Evans reviews the general structure of the book 
considering each chapter.  When he reviews the text in this manner, it becomes clear that 
we can understand each chapter as working toward making Christianity more 
intelligible.  Throughout the text, Climacus presents Christianity, or at least something 
very similar to it, as a superior alternative to the Socratic method of achieving true 
knowledge.  Generally, Evans believes that the structure reveals an extended argument 
for the superiority of Christianity as a method of achieving truth, which suggests to him 
that the text can be read as demonstrating that something like Christianity is true. 
 Evans concludes that Philosophical Fragments, when viewed as a whole, is 
clearly a book that can be read as if it were intended to make Christian views more 
plausible, claiming:  
Thus, Philosophical Fragments as a whole, read from beginning to 
end, seems as if it could be designed to make Christian faith  more 
plausible, despite the repeated claims to the contrary.  The ease 
with which the book can be read as an apologetic argument 
suggests that this reading may not simply be an example of 
“deconstructing the text” by making the author say the opposite of 
what is intended.  It suggests that apologetics of a sort may be 
what the author intended.14 
 
                                                 
14
 Evans, 72. 
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Though it seems that Climacus is often trying to make Christianity appear less 
reasonable, we can understand him as presenting a sustained case for the truth of 
Christianity.   
Avoiding the Contradiction 
I have summarized Evans’s position that Climacus presents apologetic arguments 
throughout Philosophical Fragments, and this suggests that one can read the text  as an 
attempt to make something like Christianity more plausible.  Evans reasons that the 
presence of both apologetic arguments and claims that seem to reject apologetic 
arguments presents the reader with an exclusive disjunction; namely, either Climacus is 
acting in a blatantly contradictory manner, or there must be some way of reconciling the 
apparently contradictory content.  Evans does not believe that Climacus is acting in a 
contradictory manner; rather, he believes Climacus allows room for some apologetic 
arguments while rejecting others.  Evans claims that, though he may not have been 
aware of it, Climacus was engaged in a novel form of apologetics.  Thus, in the second 
part of his essay, Evans attempts to distinguish between apologetic arguments that 
Climacus would accept and the arguments that he would not accept. I will now 
summarize how Evans addresses the anti apologetic remarks in the text. 
Evans attributes two positions to Climacus that dictate whether or not he will 
accept a given apologetic argument. First, Climacus consistently rejects apologetic 
arguments that attempt to reduce or eliminate the need for faith in religious belief.  
Second, Climacus opposes the tendency of apologists to make religious belief appear 
inoffensive.  Since Climacus believes that an incarnation is paradoxical and, as such, 
 12
offensive to reason, he rejects apologetic arguments that attempt to avoid the offensive 
character of the incarnation.  Consequently, the sort of apologetic arguments that 
Climacus allows do not eliminate the role of faith and the potential for offense.  Evans 
takes it as his task to consider what each of these arguments would look like.15 
 Evans offers two examples of arguments that violate the ban on these tactics.  
The first example seeks to demonstrate the existence of God by appealing to deduction; 
that is, where, once the premises are accepted, the conclusion that God exists necessarily 
follows.  Arguments of this form make faith unnecessary and treat belief as a strictly 
cognitive task.16   The second example Evans provides is the tradition of historical 
apologetics.  The historical apologist attempts to appeal to various historical data to 
establish the factual existence of the incarnate God in the form of Christ.  Climacus 
rejects these apologetic accounts, because they attempt to avoid the offense that exists in 
the paradoxical assertion of an incarnate God.  This does not necessarily mean that 
Climacus objects to the historical investigation of Christ qua history, but it should not be 
viewed as anything more than a strictly historical endeavor. 
 Evans argues that both examples are best described as “classical foundationalist” 
apologetics. Evans labels them as such because of their employment of certain 
epistemological claims, namely, classical foundationalist claims. Evans describes 
classical foundationalism as an epistemological theory which pursues certainty in all 
beliefs. The classical epistemological foundationalist requires that belief be “the kind of 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, 73. 
 
16
 Evans suggests that some interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s 5 ways might   
fall in to this category. Ibid, 75. 
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thing that any sane rational person who is in the appropriate position can understand and 
recognize as true.”17  Evans describes classical foundationalist apologetics as a strategy 
that “lessens the need for faith and…appears to make offense less possible.”18  Thus, 
because Climacus views the notion of an incarnate God as something that a reasonable 
person would find offensive, the foundationalist apologist could not accept Climacus’ 
account of the incarnation.   
 By contrast, Evans argues, Climacus accepts “non-foundationalist” apologetics 
because they accommodate his tactical ban. In illustrating non-foundationalist 
apologetics, Evans appeals to Climacus’ discussion of Socrates’ argument from design, 
which he advances in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.19  Socrates’ argument is that nature 
expresses design, and any design that one finds in nature requires an ultimate designer, a 
being who has endowed nature with these purposive features. Socrates concludes that 
nature is the work of a creative designer.  Unlike other renditions of the argument from 
design, Climacus believes that Socrates presupposes the existence of God.  Evans reads 
Climacus’ favorable attitude toward this argument as a sign that he is open to arguments 
for belief that presuppose the existence of God.  This position is consistent with 
Climacus’ because it does not eliminate the need for faith, but requires it.  Furthermore, 
if we understand this argument in a Christian context, it would also entail the acceptance 
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 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, trans. ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong, (Princeton:Princeton UP, 
1992.), 292.   
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of the paradoxical notion of the incarnation, and, thus, this argument fulfills the 
requirement that apologetic arguments must risk offense. 
Evans acknowledges that such an argument is circular.  That is, the argument 
from design establishes that God exists necessarily if one presupposes the existence of 
God.  What then is the value of an argument when the conclusion is presupposed?  
Evans believes that there are two respects in which this sort of argument can still be 
considered valuable.  First, the argument has the capacity to strengthen the believer’s 
convictions.  Even if others will be incapable of recognizing the connection between the 
natural world and theism, it does not follow that these links cannot be recognized by the 
believer.  Second, it is possible that those who do not have faith might still recognize a 
design in nature, and would thus have a reason for belief.20   
Evans thinks this approach is nonfoundationalist in two respects.  First, our 
experience of nature, the experience that informs our conclusions about purpose and 
design, is largely, if not altogether, subjective.  Since classical foundationalism requires 
objective criteria for determining validity, Socrates’ argument from design does not fit 
Evans’s account of classical foundationalist apologetics.  Second, because we can 
anticipate that others might reject our view of nature, we are open to the possibility that 
others will have a different view of nature.  The classical foundationalists, as Evans 
construes them, are opposed to such openness of interpretation, as they require beliefs to 
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be based on objective criteria.  Under the classical foundationalist’s view, there should 
only be one reasonable conclusion available. 21  
Though the suggestion that Philosophical Fragments contains apologetic 
arguments seems to contradict claims that Climacus makes, Evans believes that he 
demonstrates that no such contradiction exists.  It is his position that Climacus only 
rejects classical foundationalist apologetic arguments, but allows for nonfoundationalist 
arguments.  As long as the apologetic arguments allow room for offense and faith 
remains a necessary component of belief, these arguments are consistent with the 
principles that Evans attributes to Climacus.     
Some Reasons for Being Suspicious of Evans’s View 
 Though I believe Evans is correct in pointing to parts of the text as appearing to 
be apologetic, we must ask whether or not such a straightforward reading is consistent 
with Climacus’ own description of his task generally and his task in Philosophical 
Fragments particularly.   There are three reasons for thinking that Evans treatment of 
Philosophical Fragments is incomplete.  First, apologetic arguments could fit within the 
scope of Climacus’ self-described project, but not precisely as Evans has described 
them.  By examining claims made in Concluding Unscientific Postscript it is clear that 
Climacus does not intend to make any inquiry, including religious ones, easier.  If the 
sort of apologetic arguments that Evans points out are attempts to make religious beliefs 
more palatable, then Climacus would reject such arguments.  Second, Evans appears to 
offer only a formal restatement of Philosophical Fragments; that is, he offers a 
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straightforward reading of the text, with the intention of highlighting it as an apologetic 
work along the way.  Climacus, however, informs us that we are to reject strictly 
“didactic” readings as properly expressing the actual message of the text.22  Finally, 
Climacus tells us that he intends to communicate knowledge to the reader by removing 
knowledge.23  Under Evans’s reading it appears that we get a straightforward apologetic 
report, but he does not explain how his reading fits into Climacus description of the text 
as taking away knowledge and reintroducing knowledge.  Together these points provide 
strong reasons for rejecting Evans’s straightforward reading of the role of the apologetic 
claims in Philosophical Fragments.   
The first reason for viewing Evans’s argument as incomplete is rooted in the way 
that Climacus describes his project as a writer.  In his Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, Climacus provides the reader with an account of his motivation as an author.  
He states:   
There remains only one possible danger, namely, that the ease 
becomes so great that it becomes altogether too great; then there is 
only one want left, though it is not yet a felt want, when people 
will want difficulty.  Out of love for mankind, and out of despair 
at my embarrassing situation, seeing that I had accomplished 
nothing and was unable to make anything easier than it had 
already been, and moved by genuine interest in those who make 
everything easy, I conceived it as my task to create difficulties 
everywhere.24    
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 Kierkegaard, Postscript, 275. 
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 Ibid. 
 
24
 Ibid, 85-187. 
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The key claim here is Climacus’ assertion that his project helps create “difficulties 
everywhere.”  In an age rife with foundationalist assumptions, as indeed virtually all 
sociologists have observed regarding modernity, Climacus is setting himself apart as 
someone who stands against readily accessible truths.  Thus, Climacus’ comment 
provides strong evidence for rejecting Evans’s suggestion that Philosophical Fragments 
may have been written to allow room for apologetic arguments.  
 In response to my objection, Evans might appeal to Climacus’ “positive 
assessment” of Socrates’ design argument as an example of Climacus explicitly 
endorsing an apologetic argument.25   In Socrates’ argument from design Climacus picks 
out an apologetic argument that presupposes the existence of a God, and, according to 
Evans, Climacus appears to offer a favorable reading of it.  However, it is far from clear 
that Climacus’ reading of Socrates is an endorsement of apologetics qua apologetics.  
For instance, when Climacus states “[Socrates] constantly presupposes that god exists, 
and on this presupposition he seeks to infuse nature with the idea of fitness and 
purposiveness,”26 Climacus is not stating a proposition concerning the strengthening of 
belief; rather, Climacus merely tells us what Socrates sought to do.  Additionally, if the 
context of the discussion is taken seriously, it becomes clear that Climacus was not 
necessarily endorsing Socrates’ argument from design.  Climacus approaches Socrates 
within a broader discussion regarding proofs for the existence of God.  That we cannot 
demonstrate the existence of god by a proof is his primary point.  Climacus concludes 
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the only manner in which God’s existence can be demonstrated is by asserting that God 
exists as a premise.  Climacus discusses Socrates’ argument from design as an example 
that is consistent with this principle, but it is a stretch to assume that he endorses it. 
  The second and third reasons to reject Evans’s suggestion that Climacus intended 
to leave room for apologetic arguments are rooted in comments Climacus offers about a 
review of his Philosophical Fragments, and in which he states the following regarding 
this review:   
His report is accurate and on the whole dialectically reliable, but 
now comes the hitch: although the report is accurate, anyone who 
reads only that will receive an utterly wrong impression of the 
book…  The report is didactic, purely and simply didactic; 
consequently the reader will receive the impression that the 
pamphlet is also didactic.  As I see it, this is the most mistaken 
impression one can have of it.  The contrast of form, the teasing 
resistance of the imaginary construction to the content, the 
inventive audacity (which even invents Christianity), the only 
attempt made to go further (that is, further than the so-called 
speculative constructing), the indefatigable activity of irony, the 
parody of speculative thought in the entire plan, the satire in 
making efforts as if something ganz Auszerordentliches und zwar 
Neues [altogether extraordinary, that is, new] were to come of 
them, whereas what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in 
all its rightful severity—of all this the reader finds no hint in the 
report.27 
 
This observation motivates the second criticism of Evans’s argument.  As Stephen 
Mulhall has pointed out elsewhere,28 these criticisms make it clear that there is a tension 
between the form and content of the text, and one ought not lose sight of the presence of 
irony and satire when reading Philosophical Fragments, and the reasons for this will 
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become clear in the next chapter.  Consequently, this suggests that a reading of the text 
can be completely accurate in recounting the argument therein, but might fail to grasp 
the underlying message.   
When we view Evans’s argument in light of this observation the problem with 
his argument becomes clear.  By offering a straightforward, and in that respect accurate, 
recounting of the text, Evans has risked falling into the same trap as the German 
reviewer of whom Climacus speaks.  It is clear that Climacus believes a ‘dialectically 
reliable’ account lacks essential insights into the meaning of the text.  This problem 
entails another strike against Evans; he fails to address the text as a work that is 
characterized essentially by parody, irony, and satire.  At one point Evans does comment 
that the fact that one can see the text as an extended argument for Christianity implies 
that the “pose of neutrality with respect to Christianity on the part of Climacus may be 
ironically deceptive.”29    On this point I agree with Evans, but I think the above passage 
also indicates that Climacus had a stronger notion of irony in mind; that is, simply 
feigning neutrality does not appear to constitute what Climacus means by the 
“indefatigable activity of irony.”  Though his account is technically accurate, by only 
briefly considering the role of irony he fails to address Climacus’ concerns adequately.  
The third concern arises from another passage from the same section of text, 
where Climacus continues to criticize the reviewer, saying:  
And yet the book is so far from being written for nonknowers, to 
give them something to know, that the person I engage in 
conversation in this book is always  knowledgeable, which seems 
to indicate that the book is written for people in the know, whose 
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trouble is that they know too much.  Because everyone knows the 
Christian truth, it has become such a triviality that a primitive 
impression of it is acquired only with difficulty.  When this is the 
case, the art of being able to communicate eventually becomes the 
art of being able to take away or to trick something away from 
someone.  This seems strange and very ironic, and yet I believe I 
have succeeded in explaining exactly what I mean. 
 
This passage indicates that Climacus desired to communicate Christian truth in 
Philosophical Fragments by means of trickery and removing knowledge.  This 
knowledge being removed is of a particular kind, namely, knowledge of Christianity.  
Climacus tells us elsewhere that he is attempting to introduce Christianity in a novel 
manner by removing the reader’s previous store of knowledge regarding it, and then 
reintroducing it in a manner which resists  a strictly cognitive acceptance of it.30  Though 
there is more to say about this, which I will do in the next chapter, the problem this 
creates for Evans should be clear.  The story he tells in his reading of Philosophical 
Fragments is of a project aimed at presenting a sustained case for Christianity.  Evans 
does not remark on the strategy of the text as removing knowledge.  We must then ask 
how Evans’s straightforward account of the text works to take something away from the 
reader.  However, Evans nowhere tells us how his account of the text fits in with 
Climacus’ self-described strategy of taking away knowledge. 
 I have provided three reasons for thinking that Evans is incorrect in his treatment 
of the apologetic claims in Philosophical Fragments.  First, it is not reasonable to 
suppose that Climacus would so fervently attempt to create difficulties everywhere, and 
still allow apologetic arguments to make belief an easier task in the straightforward 
                                                 
30
 Kierkegaard, Postscript, 275. 
 21
manner Evans outlines in his essay.  Second, I argued that Climacus’ criticism of 
‘dialectically accurate’ readings works against the straightforward reading of 
Philosophical Fragments that Evans advances.  Finally, I pointed to Climacus’ 
discussion of the role of the text as removing knowledge in order to reintroduce it in a 
novel manner, Evans offers no explanation of how his reading of the text seems to fit 
into this conception of the text.  All of these points strongly suggest that Evans is not 
adequately expressing the intended message of the apologetic arguments in 
Philosophical Fragments.    
Closing Remarks 
I have provided three reasons for viewing Evans’s reading of the role of the 
apologetic arguments in Philosophical Fragments as incomplete.  I have not shown that 
he is incorrect in pointing out that such apologetic arguments are in the work, and this is 
because I believe that Evans is correct in saying that the text appears to advance an 
apologetic message.  However, that it is possible for Evans to have such a reading is 
entirely consistent with an ironic conception of the work.  This simply suggests that 
Evans has failed to make the ironic movement that undermines his initial reading of the 
text.  In effect, Evan is playing the role of the straight man in a comedy routine; he is the 
foil.  This, however, suggests that we need to take another look at the apologetic nature 
of the work, and attempt to understand it in a manner consistent with Climacus’ remarks.  
This is the task I shall undertake in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
In the previous chapter, I presented a particular reading of Philosophical 
Fragments offered by Stephen Evans, and drew the reader’s attention to a number of 
reasons for being skeptical of his account of the text.  The reasons for skepticism were 
largely based on claims made by Climacus regarding his strategy as an author.  In what 
follows, I will consider what I take to be a richer reading of the text propounded by 
Stephen Mulhall in his essay “God’s Plagiarist: The Philosophical Fragments of 
Johannes Climacus.”  What is of particular importance is the fact that Mulhall avoids the 
problems outlined in the previous chapter by using the interpretive claims made by 
Climacus, which appear to contradict Evans’s account, as the guiding assumptions for 
his analysis of the text.  At the close of this chapter, it should be clear that Mulhall offers 
a particularly rich account of the text.  
My discussion in this chapter will progress in three stages.  I will begin by 
outlining Mulhall’s treatment of the first three chapters of Philosophical Fragments, 
which he takes as an effort to undermine the Socratic hypothesis.  Next, I will consider 
the manner in which Mulhall’s account of the text diverges from the one offered by 
Evans.  We will see that Mulhall draws out an extremely problematic contradiction 
present in the third chapter of the text, and that important interpretive consequences 
follow from this.  Finally, I will reconsider Evans’s view in light of Mulhall’s reading of 
Philosophical Fragments. 
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 If I am successful in this chapter, I will have established several consequences.  
First, we will be able to see that Evans’s reading is correct to a degree, and there are 
good reasons to read the text as he does.  However, we will also discover that the value 
of Evans’s account is limited, as he fails to recognize an extremely problematic 
contradiction in the third chapter.  Finally, this discussion will allow us to make helpful 
observations regarding potential problems in Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review. 
Mulhall on the Philosophical Fragments 
At the end of the second chapter, I noted that Evans’s view is to be rejected 
because he did not take seriously portions of text in Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
that revealed Climacus’ view of the form of Philosophical Fragments.  If these passages 
are to be taken seriously, then it suggests that Evans’s reading is somehow incomplete.  I 
will now consider Mulhall’s reading of Philosophical Fragments in which Mulhall takes 
as essential components of his analysis the very quotes that I presented as reasons for 
rejecting Evans’s view.  In his essay, Mulhall argues that, though it appears that 
Climacus is advancing the Christian view of truth against the Socratic view of truth, 
Climacus actually advances a parody of the Christian position that is ultimately self-
undermining.  By advancing this self-undermining parody Climacus is able to gesture 
toward  a more genuine notion of Christianity.  Thus, Mulhall’s account of the text does 
not does entail an anti-Christian reading of Philosophical Fragments.  
I pointed to three portions of text that indicated Evans’s reading of Philosophical 
Fragments is potentially inconsistent with the intended meaning of the text, and two of 
these quotes were taken from Climacus’ response to a German reviewer.  The first quote 
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indicated that one can read the text in a straightforward and consistent manner, and still 
fail to recognize the central role of irony, parody and satire.  The second quote told us 
that Climacus was attempting to communicate by removing and then introducing 
knowledge in a novel way.  Since these remarks indicate the pseudonymous author’s 
desire to have the text read in a particular way, and also suggest that failing to 
acknowledge these features of the text can result in a wholly mistaken reading of the 
text, Mulhall takes these remarks as providing a strategy for properly interpreting the 
text.  He tells us as much when he states the following about Climacus’ remarks 
regarding the German reviewer. 
For our purposes, however, what matters is the direct advice it 
provides concerning how to read Philosophical Fragments proper.  
Any adequate reading must show how this text does not provide 
new information but rather takes it away, and how its incessant 
irony, parody, and satire encourage the genuine assimilation of its 
dialectical content—how overcoming the resistance of its form 
might serve to make that content more meaningful for its 
readers.31 
 
Thus, Mulhall takes Climacus’ claim that he is writing a work of “irony parody and 
satire” as an assumption and this will permeate his analysis of the work. 
Mulhall also makes the assumption that Cartesian thought plays an essential role 
in Philosophical Fragments.  He points to the first work by Climacus titled Johannes 
Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est.  In this work Climacus grapples with 
Cartesian doubt, and ultimately leaves many of his questions unanswered.  Mulhall 
points to this work, as it is an extended discussion of Cartesian concerns, and yet, little is 
said about Descartes in either Philosophical Fragments or Concluding Unscientific 
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Postscript.  Mulhall takes Climacus’ silence regarding the Cartesian concerns that were 
prominent in Climacus’ first work as suspicious.  He assumes that “Climacus’ text can 
best be understood as being in continuous but implicit dialogue with Cartesian 
philosophy.”32  This is perhaps the most controversial of Mulhall’s assertions, as there 
are a number of potential explanations for Climacus’ silence.  It is important not to 
ignore the fact that Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est remained 
unpublished, which perhaps suggests that Kierkegaard was simply dissatisfied with that 
work.  Mulhall acknowledges that the connection he is trying to make is controversial as 
well, so it is unclear just how seriously we ought to take this assumption.  At any rate, 
reflecting on Philosophical Fragments as a dialogue with Cartesian philosophy may be 
worthwhile, but it is not essential to my project.  Having clarified these assumptions, we 
can now move to the particular claims Mulhall makes about the first three chapters of the 
text.  
Like Evans, Mulhall begins his examination of the first chapter of Philosophical 
Fragments by considering the exchange that occurs between Climacus and his 
interlocutor.  For Mulhall, the most important feature of the first chapter, and what 
makes the exchange so compelling, is Climacus’ discussion of rebirth.  Climacus 
believes that our ignorance of truth is compounded by the absence of a condition that 
allows us to come to an understanding of the truth.  Climacus describes this lacking-of-a-
condition as a self-imposed fallen state, i.e., sin.  The only way of escaping our 
ignorance of the truth is by means of a rebirth, a rebirth that we are incapable of bringing 
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about, and, because of this, it must be actualized by an external source, i.e., a divine 
hand.   
Climacus says that this rebirth mirrors the initial transition from non-existence to 
existence during birth, a transition “from ‘not to be’; to ‘to be!’”33  However, as a result 
of this sharp distinction between existence and non-existence, a complication arises.  
Climacus tells us that only an existing individual can comprehend this transition.  That is 
to say, an existing individual is capable of imagining a time when she was not yet born 
and, thus, she can conceptualize of a time when she did not exist, and, alternately, the 
not yet born are incapable of conceiving of a time after birth, i.e., as existing.  The case 
of the non yet born is similar to the case of the non-existent.  Non-existing individuals 
are not capable of comprehending themselves as truly existing.  This notion of rebirth, 
claims Mulhall, is an inversion of the Cartesian claim “cogito ergo sum.”  The claim 
inverts Descartes in the respect that we are presently in a state of non-existence, and yet 
it appears that we are still capable of thought.  The argument that existence is grounded 
in the capacity for thought is undermined by the view that, though we are thinking, we 
are not truly reborn and so are not truly existing.  Though he views it as a dialogue with 
Descartes, Mulhall acknowledges that the exchange with the interlocutor serves an 
apologetic purpose, telling us that the non-human authorship of the non-Socratic position 
follows from the central notion of rebirth.     
Although Mulhall reads the second chapter in a different manner than Evans 
does, his reading can still be understood as apologetic.  As was noted in the previous 
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chapter, the second chapter of Climacus’ text presents an account of the incarnation.  
Mulhall, contra Evans, claims that it is not simply the novelty of the incarnation that 
suggests the truth of the gospel, but it is also, and more importantly, the notion that God 
needs us.   This fits into Mulhall’s reading of Philosophical Fragments as an inversion 
of Descartes because Descartes propounds a notion of a God who is free of 
imperfections.  Descartes goes so far as to claim that our existence depends upon God.  
In Climacus’ picture, God needs humanity as a lover needs his beloved.  Though 
Mulhall emphasizes a portion of the text that Evans does not, he draws a similar 
conclusion regarding chapter two, namely, that no human can truly be identified as the 
source of the view of the god presented therein.  It is the novelty of the notion of a god 
that needs humanity, and the Socratic inability to account for it, that implies that the 
Socratic approach to truth is flawed.   
Mulhall takes the third chapter of Philosophical Fragments to be a further 
response to the belief that the non-Socratic hypothesis could have been a human 
invention.  Climacus uses the chapter to argue that the principles humans employ in 
order to come to knowledge of something fail to grasp the paradoxical nature of the non-
Socratic hypothesis.  The chapter confronts the modern follower with their inability to 
grasp the paradoxical character of the non-Socratic hypothesis. 
The paradoxical character of the non-Socratic hypothesis is a product of 
Climacus equating the god with the unknowable.  For the unknowable to be truly 
unknowable, it cannot have any relation to that which is known, i.e., it must be 
absolutely different.  If the understanding has any relation to it by means of which it can 
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orient itself to it, it would not be truly unknowable.  Further, if there were any attempt to 
demarcate the unknowable from the knowable, one could simply come to an 
understanding of the unknowable by means of negation.  The difference between what is 
knowable and what cannot be known must be absolute and, as Mulhall points out, this 
absolute difference entails the following: 
The understanding must therefore negate itself absolutely, negate 
even its grasp of the difference as absolutely different from itself, since 
that too amounts to a relation between it and the difference (by way of 
self-negation), and so a negation of it as absolutely different.  But this is 
impossible: if the understanding negated even this relation to the idea of 
the absolutely different, it would not stand in any relation to it at all – in 
other words, it would be absolutely ungraspable.  Instead…the 
understanding continues to think the idea of absolute difference by using 
itself – that is, by thinking of the unknown as absolutely different from 
itself, and so as the negation of itself in some respect or other.34 
 
Since, according Climacus, the god is just the unknowable, when the understanding 
attempts to grasp the idea of a god it will always construe the god in terms of a negated 
part of the knowable.  Every attempt to advance knowledge about the unknown will fail 
because the unknowable must be absolutely different from the knowable, and so the 
attempts at grasping something of the god will only result in the illusion of illumination 
and a movement further away from the knowledge of god.  This account of the god is a 
problem for the Socratic position because the modern follower of Socrates believe that 
she can arrive at knowledge of the god.   
The problems for the modern follower of Socrates is compounded by Climacus’ 
belief that the unknowable is  
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…the passion of thought, and the thinker without paradox is like the lover 
without passion: a mediocre fellow.  But the ultimate potentiation of 
every passion is always to will its own downfall, and so it is also the 
ultimate passion of the understanding to will the collision, although in 
one way or another the collision must become its downfall.  This, then, is 
the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that 
thought itself cannot think.35   
 
Thus, the problems that mire the attempts to come to an understanding of the 
unknowable are unavoidable.  Thought desires paradox and so will seek out the 
unknowable. The trouble for the modern Socratic thinker is clear:  Given the way that 
Climacus has characterized her, the modern Socratic thinker believe that she is capable 
of knowing the unknowable and fails to recognize the fact that she is destined to grapple 
with unanswerable questions. 
 It is important to acknowledge that Plato often presents Socrates as well aware of 
the fact that he may be pursuing unanswerable questions.  For example, in the Meno 
Socrates tells Meno the following:   
…but I would contend at all costs in both word and deed as far as I could that we 
will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the 
things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find 
out what we do not know and that we must not look for it.36 
 
Thus, not only is Socrates aware of the potentially unanswerable nature of his enquiries, 
but he also believes that they are still worthwhile endeavors.  I do not wish to engage in 
the longstanding debate regarding which Socrates is the real Socrates, but it should at 
least be clear that the picture of the modern Socratic thinker that Climacus outlines is not 
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necessarily an accurate picture of a Socratic thinker in the early dialogues.  It appears 
that the Socratic thinker Climacus has in mind is one who believes that these 
unanswerable questions are answerable. 
Though Mulhall’s reading of particular parts of the text differs from the account 
that Evans provides, they both make consistent claims.  Evans attempts to emphasize 
that these portions of the text can be interpreted as making an explicit case for the 
religious position.  Mulhall, however, suggests that these claims are better understood as 
undermining the Socratic alternative of achieving truth, and they do not necessarily 
make a positive case for Christianity.  Trivially, to say that a claim works to undermine a 
position is consistent with saying that this claim can also be interpreted as providing 
support for an alternative position.  Mulhall appears to resists a reading of the text that 
interprets the first three chapters as making a positive case for the religious alternative.  
However, it is not clear what his account loses by admitting that there is a way in which 
Climacus’ first three chapters can be understood as apologetic.  In fact, Evans and 
Mulhall appear to read the text in a similar fashion.  If Evans’s remarks regarding the 
sections that Mulhall comments on are not inconsistent and potentially complimentary, 
then we can look at the direction Mulhall takes his analysis and ask how Evans’s account 
changes in light of what Mulhall reveals. 
Revealing the Contradiction 
 I have shown that Mulhall’s initial account of the first three chapters of 
Philosophical Fragments is consistent with the apologetic reading that Evans believes is 
possible.  However, Mulhall does not end his discussion of the third chapter here.  He 
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offers a crucial insight when he observes that the paradox that Climacus is accusing the 
modern follower of Socrates of violating is also a problem for Climacus.  Mulhall points 
out the following remark made by Climacus: 
If a human being is to come to truly know something about the 
unknown (the god), he must first come to know that it is different 
from him, absolutely different from him.  The understanding 
cannot come to know this by itself (Since, as we have seen, this is 
a contradiction); if it is going to come to know this, it must come 
to know this from the god, and if it does come to know this it 
cannot understand this and consequently cannot come to know 
this, for how could it understand the absolutely different?...If the 
god is absolutely different from a human being, then the human 
being is absolutely different from the god – but how is the 
understanding to grasp this?  At this point we seem to stand at a 
paradox.37 
 
Mulhall goes on to observe the following: 
…even if we assume divine authorship and delivery of the 
absolutely different, it would still ex hypothesi be ungraspable 
even by those who want to use it as part of their elaboration of the 
non-Socratic hypothesis, or as part of their defense of it against 
what they see as intellectual hubris of their Socratically-minded 
opponents.38 
 
By accusing the followers of Socrates of violating the limits of the unknown, Climacus 
walks into a paradox.  That is to say, in outlining his criticism of the follower of 
Socrates, Climacus engages in an extended analysis of the difference between the 
knowable and unknowable, claiming that the modern follower of Socrates attempts to 
know what they are ultimately incapable of knowing.  However, for Climacus to accuse 
the modern Socratic thinker of attempting to know what they cannot know suggests that 
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Climacus can demarcate the difference between the knowable and unknowable.  In the 
passage cited above, Climacus tells us that our attempts to understand this difference 
leads us into a paradox.  Thus, Climacus, by commenting on the difference between the 
knowable and unknowable in his criticism of the modern Socratic thinker, places himself 
in a relation to the unknown, the very act he claims is paradoxical.   
 One potential solution for Climacus is to claim that he received knowledge of the 
absolute difference between the knowable and unknowable from a divine source.  
However, Mulhall goes on to point out that the problem is compounded by Climacus’ 
admission that he is not himself transformed and his claim that only the truly 
transformed are capable of being in a relation to the absolutely different, saying: 
But if only transformed human beings can grasp the non-Socratic 
hypothesis, anyone offering to explain and defend that hypothesis 
would not only be presumptuously putting themselves forward as 
divinely redeemed, but should also appreciate that their offer was 
futile – since the only people for whom an explanation and 
defense of the hypothesis might be useful would be entirely 
unable to grasp it.39 
 
Climacus purported to reveal something of the non-Socratic hypothesis.  However, this 
hypothesis can only be understood by those who have been transformed in a relationship 
to the divine.  Since Climacus nowhere claims to be transformed, and we have no reason 
to believe that he is in a relationship with the god, it appears that Climacus is attempting 
to communicate a message that he cannot understand.  Further, even if Climacus has 
been transformed by a divine power, it would be useless for him to attempt to 
communicate the newfound truth to those who have not yet been transformed, as they 
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lack the condition for understanding this knowledge.  The problem is now clear.  
Climacus is attempting to communicate a message that he could not know, and his 
audience could not understand.   
  Mulhall goes on to point out that the problems that arise in light of these claims 
are not restricted to the third chapter.  Mulhall believes that Climacus suggests that all 
attempts to arrive at knowledge of the unknowable by means of a negation fail.  The first 
two arguments that Climacus advances against the modern follower of Socrates function 
by lauding a feature of the non-Socratic model that is a negated version of some feature 
of the Socratic position.  Climacus has thus failed to offer an argument that shows the 
Socratic and non-Socratic positions are truly different.  Since Climacus develops his 
discussion of the non-Socratic position by means of this negation, he never presents us 
with a true alternative.  Thus, there are problems with both the argument leveled against 
the Socratic position and the construction of the non-Socratic alternative. 
 Mulhall draws our attention back to the beginning of the text, pointing out that 
Climacus begins his discussion by asking a Socratic question; i.e., ‘can the truth be 
learned?’, and suggests that Climacus, by beginning with a Socratic question, never truly 
transcends the Socratic approach to the truth.  This means that in his presentation of the 
non-Socratic position he commits the very mistakes that he attributes to the modern 
follower of Socrates.40 
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 After revealing the contradiction implicit in Climacus’ metaphysical caprice and 
its far-reaching effects, Mulhall goes on to consider the message of Philosophical 
Fragments, noting that:  
Climacus claimed in the Postscript that his in aim in Fragments 
was to re-present our knowledge of Christianity in such a way that 
it is no longer meaningless to us.  This claim explicitly denies that 
the non-Socratic hypothesis is literally unknowable or 
unthinkable; it says rather that it has come to mean nothing to us – 
that we cannot see how or why we might come to think of 
ourselves or our lives in the particular terms it proposes.  In short, 
the real problem for Climacus is to get us to see the existential or 
spiritual point of Christianity—to appreciate once again the true 
nature of the existential challenge it poses.41 
 
By appearing to address religious questions by means of the understanding, i.e., Socratic 
analysis, Philosophical Fragments becomes a parody of the attempts to achieve a 
genuine religious life by means of the understanding.  The self-undermining that occurs 
in the third chapter does not necessarily show that the understanding is incapable of 
conceptualizing religious questions in every case—and that is not the point!—but it does 
show that Climacus’ attempt to address religious questions by means of the 
understanding is inappropriate.  By “inappropriate”, I mean that when the understanding 
is employed in religious discussions it fails to provide the proper context of religious 
discussions.  When religious language is used outside of the proper religious context, it 
fails to attain the proper meaning.  Thus, I think that the best way of reading 
Philosophical Fragments is as a text that makes a primarily normative point.   What we 
see in Climacus is a parody of religious epistemology intent on demonstrating the comic 
inappropriateness of an approach that places the understanding at the forefront and at the 
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same time gestures toward a normative conception of these concerns.  Just as it is 
possible to greet a stranger with a kiss—to do so may have interesting consequences—it 
is also not completely ruled out that the understanding is capable of approaching 
religious questions.  However, Climacus does reveals that such behavior seems 
comically inappropriate. 
 Mulhall devotes the rest of his essay to revealing how the rest of Philosophical 
Fragments works to support his reading, but I will forgo a comprehensive summary and 
analysis of the rest of his argument.  I believe that we have already arrived at the most 
important insight of the text, namely, the Philosophical Fragments demonstrates that 
applying the understanding to religious questions is inappropriate and has potentially 
comic consequences.    
Evans’s Argument Reconsidered 
 Having clarified Mulhall’s account, we can now reconsider the interpretation of 
Philosophical Fragments offered by Evans.  As was noted in the previous chapter, Evans 
offers a reading of the text that does not appear to take seriously the remarks made by 
Climacus in other texts that provide advice for how one ought to properly read 
Philosophical Fragments.  Evans’s blunt reading of the text suffers because he does not 
recognize the contradiction in the third chapter of Philosophical Fragments.  Evans 
claims that Climacus argues that reason is capable of recognizing its own limits, and he 
sees no inconsistency in the way Climacus claims this.  The suggestion that reason is 
capable of grasping its own limits is akin to suggesting that we can somehow demarcate 
a position beyond which reason can go no further.  However, as we have just seen, if 
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Climacus advocates this position, then he is violating his restriction that the known 
remains distinct from the unknown.  Reason would be required to recognize a difference 
between that which it is capable of grasping and that which it cannot grasp, and this is 
impossible for Climacus.  I must emphasize that I do not think that we can conclude 
from Climacus’ contradictory account that all attempts to demarcate a boundary for 
reason are impossible.    
It should be noted that Evans would likely challenge Mulhall’s claim that 
Climacus is contradicting himself in chapter three of Philosophical Fragments.  Though 
Evans does not address the ability to draw a limit for reason in the essay I addressed in 
the first chapter, he does comment on this issue in some of his other work.  In his book 
Faith Beyond Reason Evans argues that limits can be drawn in the respect that Kant or 
the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus attempt to draw such limits.42  My response is simply 
to note that Mulhall makes a strong case that the limits that Climacus discusses in the 
third chapter appear to be problematic for Climacus.  The mere fact that a limit might be 
possible does not necessarily mean that Climacus has effectively drawn such a limit.   
Evans would have to have argued that Climacus, in particular, does not contradict 
himself.  Further, Mulhall’s reading would appear consistent with Climacus’ remarks 
that the text is a work of irony, parody, and satire. 
Additionally, in the second chapter of my thesis one may have objected to my 
appeal to Climacus’ remarks about the German reviewer as posing problems for Evans’s 
reading of Philosophical Fragments.  That is, Evans could easily have argued that I had 
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not offered any reason to trust Climacus’ remarks about the text.  However, it is clear 
that the problems that arise in the third chapter of the text appear explicable in one of 
two ways.  Kierkegaard is either simply incompetent and commits himself to advancing 
an argument that he is not able to recognize as illogical, or the contradiction is 
intentional.  Given the advice Climacus offers on reading the text, it appears obvious that 
it is more reasonable to understand the contradiction as playing a role in Climacus’ 
ironic, satiric, and parodistic enterprise, rather than being the oversight of an 
incompetent writer.  In this respect, the contradiction provides an even stronger reason to 
take Climacus’ remarks seriously. 
Closing Remarks 
 Though Evans and Mulhall have accounts of the first three chapters of the text 
that do not conflict, Mulhall’s account of the text diverges drastically when he 
recognizes the contradiction that arises from Climacus’ account of the knowable and 
unknowable in the third chapter.  If Mulhall’s reading is correct, then the non-Socratic 
alternative trumpeted by Climacus is simply a parody of the Christian position that never 
truly transcends the Socratic, and when the limits of reason come under scrutiny, the 
position is “hoist by its own petard.”43  However, when the position collapses, it is not 
simply a negative event.  Rather, it allows Climacus to demonstrate the 
inappropriateness of attempting to address religious questions by means of the 
understanding, i.e., as a Socratic thinker.  In the next chapter, we will see how the 
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method employed in the Philosophical Fragments might explain some of the 
problematic issues that arise in A Literary Review. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONSIDERING A LITERARY REVIEW 
I now turn my attention to considering Kierkegaard’s work A Literary Review. 44  
In the present chapter, I will reflect on some potential problems in this work as outlined 
in an essay by Daniel W. Conway entitled “Modest Expectations: Kierkegaard’s 
Reflections on the Present Age.”45  Conway claims that Kierkegaard advances disparate 
claims about the role of reflexion and of religious authenticity.  My task will be to 
consider whether Mulhall’s reading of Philosophical Fragments offers any promising 
insight into how one might be able to make sense of the vexing claims Conway locates 
in A Literary Review.  I will demonstrate that, though Philosophical Fragments appears 
to be an unlikely solution to the problem in A Literary Review, it still emerges as a 
potential solution.  
I will advance my point in several phases.  I begin by first commenting on why it 
is important to take A Literary Review seriously, even though compared to Kierkegaard’s 
other works it might appear peculiar.  Next, I will attempt to summarize the major 
features of A Literary Review and summarize Conway’s account of the problem it raises.  
I will then consider, generally, why Philosophical Fragments appears to bear a special 
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relationship to A Literary review, and consider how it might offer some solutions to the 
problems Conway outlines in the text. 
Taking the Review Seriously 
A Literary Review is a peculiar work by Kierkegaard in that he seemingly departs 
from some of the tools he commonly uses as a writer.  Unlike most of his previous 
works, Kierkegaard does not employ the use of a pseudonym and the work itself 
primarily consists of an analysis and review of another author’s work, namely, Two Ages 
by Thomasine Christine Gyllembourg-Ehrensvärd.  Though attaching his own name to a 
work is not unprecedented, Kierkegaard often only abandoned his pseudonyms for 
works that were explicitly religious, and since A Literary Review is not an explicitly 
religious work the lack of a pseudonym is peculiar.  The use of a review also appears out 
of character for Kierkegaard and at the very least we might wonder about how seriously 
we ought to take a review; after all, it is not very common for thinkers to communicate 
their most important ideas via the medium of a book review.  Confronted with these 
facts we may be unsure whether we ought to give the work special status because it is 
attributed to Kierkegaard, meaning it somehow represent his true views, or that we ought 
to take it less seriously because it is merely a review.  
 Alastair Hannay points out that Kierkegaard does not depart from his general 
method of toying with the notion of authorship, and he does so by drawing our attention 
to the following journal entry in the introduction to his translation of A Literary Review: 
To now I have served by helping the pseudonyms become authors.  What if I 
decided from now to do what little writing I can indulge in in the form of 
criticism, putting what I had to say in reviews which developed my thoughts 
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out of some book or other?  So they could also be found in the book.  Then at 
least I’d avoid being an author.46 
 
Hannay notes that Kierkegaard can now maintain the desired authorial distance from his 
works by letting it appear as though the ideas he offers in his review are generated by the 
author of the reviewed text and are not necessarily his own.  It is perhaps telling that 
Kierkegaard’s review of “Two Ages” is often referred to as “Two Ages,” and I imagine 
this fact would please him, as it creates further ambiguity about the identities of the 
authors.  This also suggests to the reader that, though A Literary Review is a departure 
from his other methods, Kierkegaard saw this work as functioning in a similar manner as 
his pseudonymous works.  The fact that the work is merely a review is not grounds for 
not taking the work seriously. 
A Brief Summary of A Literary Review 
In A Literary Review, Kierkegaard picks up on the author’s distinction between 
the “Age of Revolution” and “the present age,” and uses this distinction to mount a 
major criticism of contemporary Danish culture.  Kierkegaard tells us that the Age of 
Revolution is characterized by passion, that is, a deep commitment to the causes of the 
age.  The present age lacks direction, and is characterized by excessive reflection, 
careful deliberation, and an inability to be decisive. 
Because the Age of Revolution is passionate, many other qualities follow, e.g., 
form, culture, violence towards everything but the defining idea, decorum, immediacy, 
make up just a brief list of the many attributes that Kierkegaard claims characterize the 
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Age of Revolution.  However, what seems to be most important for Kierkegaard is the 
ability of the Age of Revolution, with its defining idea, to imbue a society and an 
individual with a meaningful existence, and the equilibrium that follows. 
The Age of Revolution is sharply contrasted with the present age as an age in 
which the defining idea has disintegrated.  In A Literary Review, Kierkegaard makes the 
consequences of this disintegration clear:     
If the essential passion is taken away, the one motivation 
and everything becomes meaningless externality, devoid of 
character, then the spring of ideality stops flowing and life 
together becomes stagnant water...47    
 
Kierkegaard describes the present age telling us that it is an age characterized by 
deliberation, giving us the tragically comic image of a suicide victim who so carefully 
deliberates whether he should take his own life that he is strangled by the process.  “A 
premeditated suicide he was not, but a suicide by means of premeditation.”48  The 
comical aside, Kierkegaard presents a seriously bleak picture of the sort of trap that 
reflection becomes.  I take it that Kierkegaard believes it traps us because there is no 
directing idea, it is reflection for reflection’s sake.  When given a choice between action 
or reflection, reflection will always win. 
Conway's Concern 
Conway's concern can be stated in the following way:  The totality of the age and 
the excessive reflection and degenerative leveling that characterize Kierkegaard's 
contemporary Denmark are only overcome by achieving a genuinely religious life, but 
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the manner in which Kierkegaard describes a defining idea makes the religious solution 
appear unlikely.  What Conway is most interested in his how Kierkegaard works out the 
relationship between the freedom necessary for a genuine religious existence and the 
necessary limits imposed upon the individual by the age she finds herself in and the 
curious fact that some ages may allow for an authentic religious existence while others 
do not. 
What Kierkegaard means by an “age” is rather comprehensive and overarching in 
its scope and influence.  Kierkegaard’s spends considerable time discussing the 
influence of the age on the individual.  Thus, the comprehensive character of an age 
becomes a problem when we consider Kierkegaard's notion of reflexion.  Conway notes, 
“Kierkegaard's appeal to the socializing power of reflexion introduces a formidable 
element of necessity in his review of the two ages.  In accordance with the mechanism of 
reflexion, individuals involuntarily reflect and embody the character of the age they 
represent.”49  So, we can understand Kierkegaard to mean that the all encompassing 
features of an age, coupled with the reflexion that takes place wherein individuals mirror 
the characteristics of their age, suggests that the individual’s ability to act freely, and 
thereby authentically, may be entirely removed.  Said in another way, the individual 
cannot help but participate in the character of the age, and cannot understand herself 
apart from the age. 
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Conway believes that the necessity of the age becomes even more apparent when 
the role of a defining idea is considered, and he points to the following passage by 
Kierkegaard: 
    When individuals (each one individually) are essentially and 
passionately related to an idea, and together are essentially related 
to the same idea, the relation is optimal and normative.  
Individually the relation separates them (each one has himself for 
himself), and ideally it unites them.  Where there is essential 
inwardness, there is a decent modesty between man and man that 
prevents crude aggressiveness; in the relation of unanimity to the 
idea there is the elevation that again in consideration of the whole 
forgets the accidentality of details.  Thus the individuals never 
come too close to each other in the herd sense, simply because 
they are united on the basis of an ideal distance.50  
 
Conway reasons from this claim that a defining idea can ultimately determine whether or 
not one can foster a genuinely inward and authentic relationship, i.e., 'each one has 
himself for himself.'  It appears that Kierkegaard is advancing a view of the self that is 
severely encumbered by the historical setting of the age, and this is strange in light of his 
constant demand for authenticity.   What of the individual who does not have the luxury 
of living in an age in which they are defined in a manner that allows her to pursue 
herself for herself? 
In the present age there is no defining idea and therefore the scenario described 
in the previous passage, where the society and the individual are properly related to the 
idea, cannot take place.  Since it is the proper relationship obtaining by virtue of the age 
that allows an authentic existence to take place, it initially appears that a genuinely 
authentic existence is not possible for an individual in the present age.  Of course, the 
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notion that it is the age in which one lives that dictates whether or not one can live an 
authentic existence appears to contrast greatly with the rest of Kierkegaard's works, 
which appear to suggest that one can in fact live an authentic existence. 
The prospect of achieving authenticity in the present age also appears dubious 
because of the problem of “leveling” Kierkegaard outlines (“leveling” being 
Kierkegaard’s  notion that “all ideas, people, causes and goals will be reduced to mere 
subjects of reflection and discussion”).51  Kierkegaard tells us that the leveling tendency 
is beyond the will of the individuals to prevent, and, in fact, everyone is working in 
service of it.  Conway points to the apocalyptic picture Kierkegaard provides in the 
following passage: 
No particular individual (the eminent personage by reason of 
excellence and the dialectic of fate) will be able to halt the 
abstraction of leveling, for it is a negatively superior force, and the 
age of heroes is past.  No assemblage will be able to halt the 
abstraction of levelling, for in the context of reflection the 
assemblage itself is in the service of leveling.  The abstraction of 
levelling...will stay with us, as they say of a tradewind that 
consumes everything.52 
 
Thus, it appears that the prospect for an authentic existence to take form is not just bleak, 
but potentially impossible; strangely, this is not what Kierkegaard concludes. 
Kierkegaard reveals that the present age, despite its excessive reflection, is in fact 
an age that allows for a genuine religious existence.  Further, Kierkegaard tells us it is by 
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virtue of the excessive reflection in the present age that makes a religious leap possible.53  
Conway remarks on Kierkegaard’s apparent change in position, saying: 
Despite his account of the present age as enervated, dispassionate, 
irresolute, and irremediably decadent, Kierkegaard nevertheless 
celebrates the age for delivering its representatives to the 
threshold  of a momentous either/or: “every individual either is 
lost or, disciplined by the abstraction, finds himself religiously…”  
Rather than resign himself to the excessive, self-consuming 
reflection that marks the present age, he urges his readers to 
transform their historical destiny into a fortuitous occasion for 
religious salvation: “Reflection is a snare in which one is trapped, 
but in and through the inspired leap of religiousness the situation 
changes and it is the snare that catapults one into the embrace of 
the eternal.”54 
 
At this point, the incongruity appears obvious.  Given the totality of the age, the 
disintegration of a defining idea, and the inevitability of leveling, it seems that an 
individual's orientation to the world is wholly subject to the accidental features of her 
age, and she has little choice as to whether or not she can maintain an authentic 
existence.  Conway’s criticism is that Kierkegaard cannot maintain both his account of 
the present age and that those who live in it are capable of pursuing a genuinely religious 
existence.   
It is not difficult to sympathize with Conway's confusion.  Kierkegaard presents a 
theory of ages that appears to curtail the possibility of an authentic existence in the 
present age, and yet he believes that an authentically religious existence is just what the 
present age makes possible.  It should be noted that though Conway believes an 
authentic religious existence is impossible given Kierkegaard’s account of the present 
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age, he does believe Kierkegaard can achieve an instance of repetition, an option that I 
will not here consider. 
Philosophical Fragments and A Literary Review 
Having outlined the general features of A Literary Review, I would now like to 
consider why it is reasonable to think that Philosophical Fragments can provide insight 
about some of the remarks in A Literary Review.  I am certainly not the first to suggest 
that a potentially important relationship between these works exists,55 but I still feel it is 
worth clarifying why I think there are reasons to look for connections between these 
works. 
If we are to take The Point of View for My work as an Author56 seriously, then it 
suggests that Kierkegaard has a rather unified project in his works; consider the 
following quote from his introduction to this work: 
The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I truly 
am as an author, that I am and was a religious author, that the 
whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, or the 
problem ‘of becoming a Christian’, with a direct or indirect 
polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom…57 
 
Given this passage, it seems clear that Kierkegaard was intent on being a Christian 
author in the respect that he wanted to write books that could facilitate a genuine 
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religious existence.  Recognizing this allows us to avoid postulating exclusive intentions 
in each text, and gives us further reason to think that these works could mutually 
elucidate their respective meanings.   Of course, with this passage in mind, it would be 
just as reasonable to pick any of Kierkegaard’s works and expect it to reveal the same 
message as any other work we could select.  So, it is possible that I have overstated my 
case.  However, there are also reasons to think that we ought to consider specifically A 
Literary Review and Philosophical Fragments together.   
 Philosophical Fragments speaks at great length regarding the understanding and 
its relationship to religious questions.  In the previous chapter, I concluded with Mulhall 
that the work could be understood as a parody of attempts to employ the understanding 
in religious concerns.  There has been considerable debate regarding the proper way we 
are to understand Climacus’ use of the term ‘understanding’ (Forstand),58 but much of 
this debate surrounds whether Kierkegaard intended the word to be understood in the 
technical sense (something akin to a Kantian faculty) or as a more colloquial phrase.  
However, it seems that both ways of understanding the phrase suggest a potential 
connection with the notion of reflection in A Literary Review.  Insofar as the 
“understanding” represents one’s ability to comprehend or make sense of the world, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the excessive reflection that occurs in the present age would 
be deeply related to Climacus’ notion of understanding.  In describing the excessive 
reflection that takes place in the present age Kierkegaard makes it exceedingly clear that 
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both ‘prudence’ and ‘deliberation’ play important roles in the lives of those who are 
members of it.59  Insofar as individuals want to appear prudent, it is sensible to suppose 
that they will attempt to make decisions that appear to reflect the proper employment of 
reason, i.e., the understanding.  Likewise, excessive deliberation is marked by a similar 
desire to act in a careful and reasonable manner, and  In both cases it appears that 
employment of the understanding is a necessary condition for prudence and deliberation.     
 We can discover another reason for thinking that Philosophical Fragments might 
offer insight into the meaning of A Literary Review when we compare comments made 
by Kierkegaard regarding the purpose of Philosophical Fragments and the problem in 
the present age.  In A Literary Review Kierkegaard tells us the following of the present 
age: 
We do not want to abolish the monarchy, by no means, but if little 
by little we could get it transformed into make-believe, we would 
gladly shout 'Hurrah for the King!'...  In the same way we are 
willing to keep Christian terminology but privately know that 
nothing decisive is meant by it.60 (emphasis added). 
 
Here Kierkegaard identifies one of the major problems of the present age as being that 
Christian terminology no longer means anything decisive.  In the previous chapter I 
quoted an instance where Mulhall reminded us of Climacus' intention in Philosophical 
Fragments by noting “Climacus claimed in the Postscript that his aim in the Fragments 
was to re-present our knowledge of Christianity in such a way that it is no longer 
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meaningless.”61  Given this claim, it appears reasonable to think that Philosophical 
Fragments could be seen as a potential antidote to one of the major ills of the present 
age, and in this respect Philosophical Fragments appears to be a promising text to 
consider as a potential explanation for the problem that Conway outlines.     
 In the previous chapter, we saw that Climacus constructed a self-undermining 
parody of Christianity as a means of gesturing toward an alternative method of 
approaching religious questions.  Since the primary targets of Philosophical Fragments 
are attempts to address religious questions by means of the understanding and it appears 
that an age characterized by reflection would likely obsess over the understanding, 
Philosophical Fragments appears to be a likely response to the present age.  At this 
point, we can see why it is reasonable to suppose that Philosophical Fragments may 
offer some insight regarding remarks made in A Literary Review. 
Toward a Solution 
 It now seems reasonable for us to consider the potential for Philosophical 
Fragments to offer a solution to Conway's concern.  The question we bring to the text is 
this: how can Kierkegaard maintain that the age has a total determining influence on the 
individual, and yet also claim that the individual can live an authentically religious life?  
Though there is one potential solution that appears as an initial possibility, problems 
arise immediately after articulating it.   
 In the previous chapter I explained how Climacus employs self-contradiction to 
attack the employment of the understanding in religious questions.  The strategy was to 
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suggest that when someone recognizes the implicit contradiction in the position that 
Climacus presents, she is forced to reconsider the validity of using the understanding as 
a means of grasping or answering religious questions, and thus the possibility of a 
genuine religious existence might emerge.  It appears that by noting the paradoxical 
character of the understanding Philosophical Fragments presents a potential strategy for 
stopping the endless reflection that plagues those in the present age.  Thus, in the case of 
an individual in the present age, the hope would be that by reading a text like 
Philosophical Fragments they would be able to recognize the problems inherent in 
excessive reflection and the role that the understanding plays in it, thereby allowing the 
individual to opt out of the excessive reflection that dominates the age.     
 However, if I am correct in my account of Philosophical Fragments, we 
immediately encounter a problem with the solution I have just proposed.  Kierkegaard 
claims that “The present age is essentially a sensible age, devoid of passion, and 
therefore it has nullified the principle of contradiction.”62  Here Kierkegaard tells us that 
it is the result of an essential character of the present age that the principle of 
contradiction has been nullified.  Coupling this fact with the concerns that Conway 
outlines above regarding the overarching influence of an age, it suggests that an 
individual existing in the present age would be incapable of recognizing a contradiction 
if one presented itself.  This means that when Climacus employs contradiction in 
Philosophical Fragments it would remain necessarily unrecognized by the reader in the 
present age.  Furthermore, the problem seems especially curious when we consider 
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whether Kierkegaard as an individual in the present age would himself be able to employ 
contradiction as a means of communication. 
 Given the fact that Kierkegaard, via Climacus, does appear to make use of the 
notion of contradiction in an attempt to make a religious leap possible, it might be 
reasonable to question the  totality of the influence of the present age.  If Kierkegaard 
truly believed that the age was so complete in its influence, then it appears that his 
efforts in Philosophical Fragments are futile.  It is important to not lose sight of the fact 
that Kierkegaard is writing as a member of the present age, and perhaps his account of 
the totalizing influence of the age is merely another expression of the age.  Immediately 
this calls into question the validity of Kierkegaard's account of the present age.  Though 
his language about the age is extremely pessimistic, this may just mean that the vast 
majority of individuals are doomed to live by the standards of the present age, while a 
select few may still be able to overcome the influence of the age.   
 Here we return to the question of how someone might be able to overcome the 
limits of the present age.  Once again, I would recommend a return to the method in 
Philosophical Fragments, that is, bringing the reader to a position where they recognize 
the comical incongruity of addressing religious questions by means of the understanding.  
However, in order to take this work seriously we must reconsider what it means for the 
present age to have annulled the law of non-contradiction.  It was potentially incorrect 
for me to assume that the annulment of the law of non-contradiction was in fact an 
epistemic annulment and that individuals in the present age are incapable of cognizing it.  
It may be better to understand the annulment of the law of non-contradiction as an 
 53
inability to act in the face of a contradiction, which seems to be more consistent with 
Kierkegaard’s broader concerns.   
 Philosophical Fragments has once again emerged as a possible means of making 
a religious leap possible.  It seems feasible to suppose that some individuals will be able 
break out of the excessive reflection that plagues the present age by recognizing the 
comical incongruity of employing the understanding in attempting to address religious 
questions.  However, it should be emphasized that the ability to overcome the limits of 
the present age would still be extremely rare. 
Closing Remarks 
 In this chapter, I demonstrated that there are some good reasons for being 
cautiously optimistic that Philosophical Fragments presents a potential means of 
escaping the hyper-reflection of the present age.  I began by arguing that it is sensible to 
take A Literary Review seriously as a work.  Next, after briefly outlining some of the 
major ideas working in A Literary Review, I summarized Conway’s concerns regarding 
the potential for a genuine religious existence.  Faced with Conway’s problem, it became 
clear that Philosophical Fragments represents a promising solution.  It also became clear 
that if we take the totality of the age and the annulment of the law of non-contradiction 
seriously, then the use of Philosophical Fragments as a means of escaping the age 
appears problematic.  However, if the influence of the age is not total, and we offer an 
alternative account of the annulment of the law of non-contradiction, then it might be 
reasonable to suppose that Philosophical Fragments still offers a means of escaping the 
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hyper-reflection of the present age.  Though a genuine religious existence remains 
unlikely, it now appears possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 
I will now summarize the content of each chapter, and note what I believe I 
achieved in each section.  I will conclude by offering account of the significance of my 
thesis.  Though I think my accomplishments are humble and potentially controversial, I 
still think I have offered a valuable insight into the relationship between Philosophical 
Fragments and A Literary Review.  
In Chapter II, I provided three reasons for viewing Evans’s reading of the role of  
Philosophical Fragments as a work of apologetics as incomplete.  I agreed with Evans 
that there are apologetic arguments in the text, but claimed his analysis of their function 
was incomplete.  Furthermore, I suggested that it is possible to recognize the presence of 
apologetic arguments in the text, but view them as part of an ironic conception of the 
work.  This simply suggests that Evans has failed to make the ironic movement that 
undermines his initial reading of the apologetic remarks.  I took these claims to indicate 
that another account of the text that attempts to understand it in a manner consistent with 
Climacus’ remarks might be necessary. 
In Chapter III, I showed that Evans and Mulhall have accounts of the first three 
chapters of the text that sound surprisingly similar.  I outlined how Mulhall’s account 
diverges drastically from Evans's when Mulhall recognizes the contradiction that arises 
from the way Climacus discusses the difference between the knowable and unknowable.  
I argued that if Mulhall’s reading is correct, then the non-Socratic alternative offered by 
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Climacus is simply a parody of the Christian position that never truly transcends the 
Socratic.  Additionally, the manner in which Climacus criticizes the limits of reason in 
ultimately becomes self-undermining.  I also suggested that is is by means of this 
collapse that Kierkegaard, through Climacus, can demonstrate the inappropriateness of 
attempting to address religious questions by means of the understanding.  In this chapter 
I was able to offer a richer account of Philosophical Fragments and explain more clearly 
the incompleteness of Evans's view of the text.    
In Chapter IV, I demonstrated that there are good reasons for being optimistic 
that Philosophical Fragments presents a potential means of escaping the hyper-reflection 
of the present age.  I argued that we can safely take A Literary Review seriously, and I 
outlined the problems Conway finds in the text.  I clarified why I think Philosophical 
Fragments represents a particularly promising candidate for a solution to Conway's 
concerns.  It became clear that if we take the totality of the age and the annulment of the 
law of non-contradiction seriously, then the use of Philosophical Fragments as a means 
of escaping the age appears especially problematic.  Alternatively, I suggested that if the 
influence of the age is not necessarily insurmountable, then it appears reasonable to 
suppose that Philosophical Fragments still might offer a means of escaping the hyper-
reflection of the present age.   
 It was the purpose of this thesis to examine the potential for a particular reading 
of Philosophical Fragments to elucidate confusing claims made in A Literary Review.  If 
I have been successful in my task, then I have demonstrated three central claims:  First, I 
have shown that Evans accurately claims that there are apologetic arguments in 
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Philosophical Fragments, but his analysis of the text remains incomplete.  Second, I 
have shown that Mulhall offers a more complete account of Philosophical Fragments.  
Third, I have show that we can apply Mulhall’s reading of the text to achieve better 
picture of the way someone might achieve a genuine religious life in the present age.  
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